This article examines the role of opinion polls in East European countries, and assesses the impact that they have had on the general processes of political democratisation there since the collapse of communism.
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An alternative view maintains that in liberal-capitalist societies, the political systems are largely closed to the public, with political power monopolised by small elite groups. 9 For instance, Schumpeter's model of 'competitive elitism' defines democracy as: 'an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which the individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote'. 10 Using this characterisation of democracy, the chief concern of those who commission opinion polls is not that they should be used to devolve power to voters, but that they should be used to help gain further political power and influence for themselves. Thus, polls are conducted not to empower wider society, but to sustain the political hegemony of elites.
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Polls and Democracy in Liberal-Capitalist Societies
Undoubtedly, opinion polling plays a significant role within the political process of most liberalcapitalist societies, where it is used by governments, parties and the mass media alike. 12 However, the extent to which polls complement and improve democratic practice in countries like Britain is unclear. Their role is at best double-edged. On one hand, the political landscape is such that political elites need to be responsive to public opinion in order to retain political power. If they systematically ignore voter concerns then they may be punished at subsequent elections. Political elites may use opinion polls as part of the process through which they establish direct contact with voters to nullify this risk. Polls provide political elites with the intelligence information to:
determine when and how to respond to the prevailing mood of the electorate; consider the views and likely responses of voters when designing, marketing, implementing, and modifying party policies; gain feedback about the public's reactions to these policies, to issues and to events. 13 In this way, polls fulfil a key function in terms of establishing political linkages between political elites and voters, and in so doing, provide a channel through which the public are able to make some indirect input into the affairs of government.
However, this does not include the control of political elites. Polls do not challenge the dominance and power of political elites. Instead, they provide information with which these elites might devise strategies to successfully compete with rivals to secure political power. In Britain for instance, political parties commission polls to win elections to government office. 14 In order to meet these objectives, the competing parties aim to sustain the loyalty of traditional core supporters, and to win over groups of floating voters. Thus, polls are used to identify how policies can be packaged and presented to the electorate in order to maximise a party's share of the vote in elections. Furthermore, parties make use of polls by investigating which are the issues upon which 4 its rivals are most vulnerable electorally, and which it is itself particularly strong. The party can then benefit from this information by campaigning aggressively on these issues, steering the focus of media and public attention towards them, and consequently shaping the political agenda in ways which undermine the credibility of its rivals, and elevate its own standing amongst the electorate.
Because polls perform such a useful and effective role in these respects, parties tend to nurture enduring relationships with the pollsters, and structure polling projects into the heart of their campaigning machinery and strategies. In this way, polls may be said to both facilitate and manipulate the democratic process in liberal-capitalist societies.
Polls in East European Societies: 1945 to 1989
Observing the changing status and activities of opinion polls in East European societies provides an interesting insight into the way that they both impact upon, and are themselves influenced, by the political process.
Opinion Polls and Communism
The During the Stalinist period, every attempt to express independent opinion on social or political issues was brutally suppressed. The notion of public opinion was officially condemned and sociology was banned from the universities of all communist countries as a Western 'pseudo-science'. 5 Essentially, internal public politics did not exist. Politics was generally only public at the international level, with governments either extending friendship to other communist political systems, or engaged in an ideological offensive against global capitalism. Internally, societies were highly politicised in terms of party membership and public propaganda, but there was a notable absence of 'politics' in the sense of publicly competing interests and adversarial opinions.
One-party states were the norm, with political priorities limited to one goal (the emancipation of humankind) while class, and hence class struggle, was not officially acknowledged to exist. There was no effective choice between parties. There were no conflicting ideologies concerning how society and the economy should be run. There were therefore presumed to be no differences amongst citizens in terms of their political values and orientations. 17 As Webb 18 explains:
One overriding factor, the predominance of the communist party and its particular philosophy, means that much of the subject matter which was the source of the growth of opinion polling in Western countries… reporting divided opinions in the community on political issues, do not happen.
Where polling did take place, it was usually carefully controlled by the political elites, and met with significant scepticism by the public. 19 Indeed, political leaders were often highly critical of opinion polls. For instance, the reform period of the Polish October of 1956 was noticeable by the relative openness in the approach of the Gomulka's Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) to opinion polling. Shortly after however, the government re-imposed censorship and restrictions on the press and the academic community, and in particular, on sociology:
Polish empirical sociologists were publicly denounced as infected with 'pollingmania', and as neglecting a Marxist theory of social consciousness. Questionnaires were censored and very few, if any, copies of results were published. 20 Furthermore, at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the PUWP in 1963, set up to discuss ideological issues in Polish society, a special session was devoted to sociology. Sociologists were criticised for their emphasis on Western methodological approaches, for their apparent concentration on recent Western theoretical achievements, and for their lack of enthusiasm for orthodox Marxist-Leninist accounts of historical development and society. As a result, the directors of the state-owned polling agency, Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej (OBOP) were removed from their posts, and the activities of the institute were reorganised and scaled down. 21 
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, polling continued to operate at OBOP, but this was carefully controlled by the Communist authorities, and had a restricted scope of coverage. Political issues were considered by the party leadership to be generally out of bounds for the pollsters, except where these presented a positive image of the party and its programmes, or where they could be manipulated and published for propaganda purposes. 22 According to Szymondarski, 23 a former director of OBOP, polls were used by the regime as an instrument for the legitimisation of communist rule:
The polls used by the political elite were restricted in the issues that they surveyed.
The elite pretended to be open, but all opposition was banned, ideas of selfgovernment were banned. There were no proper democratic political institutions.
The elite only spent money on the polls if the results were favourable to the regime.
In this way, the polls helped to prop up the regime, and assist political stability.
The main role of the polls was to make up for the democratic institutions which were lacking in Poland, but only in one dimension -the propaganda dimension.
Polls in East European Societies: The Postcommunist Experience
Since the collapse of communism, political opinion polls have achieved a high-profile status in political affairs throughout Eastern Europe. In previous research, it was revealed that policymakers, politicians and political parties made much use of polls in the early years of democratic transition, although for various reasons they were received with significant scepticism by each of these users and by citizens alike. 24 In the remaining sections of this article there is a focus exclusively on opinion polling in Bulgaria which is designed to address broader issues concerning the role and impact of polls on the political process in postcommunist countries. This discussion is intended firstly, to indicate the extent to which opinion polls continue to perform an important role in party electioneering in Bulgaria. The second objective is to reveal the underlying rationale that Bulgarian political parties and political elites have in using opinion polls. Are parties genuinely interested in devolving political power directly to citizens, by providing voters with a means through which their views and interests can be heard (and acted upon) by political elites?
Or, are polls used for purely instrumental reasons, as part of a party's marketing strategy to increase its political power and influence?
Polls and Political Parties in Postcommunist Bulgaria
Earlier research 25 has revealed that, like their counterparts in Western Europe and the USA, political parties in Eastern Europe frequently use publicly-reported polls in their electioneering.
Such polls are used to monitor electoral opinion, to build electoral strategies, to identify the issue 7 priorities of the electorate and of targeted groups, to modify and shape the image of parties, and to guide focused campaigning (in terms of selecting key geographic areas and electoral groupings).
In Bulgaria, only a minority of political parties have access to sufficient resources to be able to commission their own polling projects. This is largely because of the nature of the party system which impedes the development of strong and sustained party-pollster links of the kind that are noticeable in countries like Britain. The proliferation of parties 26 results in a situation where demand for the polls as a source of political intelligence to help market the parties cannot be satisfied. 27 Nonetheless, the political parties are typically very attentive to the messages emerging from opinion polls. Elena Poptodorova, Political Council member of the Bulgarian Euroleft Coalition (KE), 28 claims that across Bulgaria, political parties observe polling results with a critical indicated that the plans were hugely unpopular with the public, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party mounted a successful campaign in opposition to the proposals: 'Public opinion somehow influenced that. The government thought it wouldn't serve the purpose to agitate people in this way'. 31 We have seen then, that political actors in Bulgaria often use polls to help decide the focus and structure of policy-positioning. This approach to opinion polling reflects an underlying assumption held by many involved in Bulgarian political affairs that there is a need to reach beyond traditional party structures, and to establish direct communication with voters. Polls are often considered to be a useful mechanism for achieving this goal:
It is impossible to make politics without opinion polls. It is impossible. It is not professional. You have no grounds. You go to party meetings, you meet the people who are of course devoted to the idea -they are very active and so on. But this is not the majority of the people. You have to know about people, how they really think. 32 This suggests that political parties use polls primarily to compete more effectively within the political arena, rather than to establish a more participatory form of political system. In order to achieve this competitiveness, parties recognise that they need to adopt a flexible approach to the electorate, and opinion polls provide a useful means for achieving this.
One of the major political parties recently developed an innovative opinion polling programme to establish on-going links with voters in preparation for the 1999 local elections. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) set up a nationally co-ordinated project involving intensive, localised polling research. Local party members and supporters were trained by professional polling agencies in basic opinion polling methodology, and then designed and managed the research themselves. It was intended that the results from these localised studies would complement the national campaigning programme by revealing which issues were of importance to local communities, and how they should be approached and presented. Previous research 38 indicates that in the early period after the fall of communist-led regimes in Eastern Europe, polls had frequently been used by new political parties in their general campaigning strategies, and in a variety of ways. These included guiding party tactics in relation to whether to form or leave coalitions with other parties, and also which electoral groups to target in their campaigning. For the relatively new KE coalition, polls performed similar functions.
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Firstly, in terms of how they would be perceived by voters who were typically predisposed to either the BSP or the UDF:
We used to belong to the BSP and we split in 1996. So to me it was curious to know how would we be viewed [in polls] having left the previous majority and having formed a new party. 39 The KE also asked questions in the polls specifically about which group of voters might potentially become a 'natural' electoral constituency for the Party. The data which emerged formed an important element of the process through which the Party identified key target groups for focused campaigning -disaffected left-wing traditionalists, as well as the relatively young, the highly educated, and those voters living in urban areas:
The pendulum is still running in extremes. for Georgi Pirinski as its 1996 Presidential candidate was in part informed by internallycommissioned opinion polls. These polls suggested that no other BSP candidate could win the election. 43 In this discussion, we have seen that opinion polls perform various useful functions for Bulgarian political parties in shaping their electioneering strategies. They help the parties to decide upon their policy agendas, which policies should be emphasised publicly during an election campaign, how policy positions should be presented, how to identify potential electoral allies, and candidate 12 selection. This has been revealed in previous research across East Europe in the early years of democratic transition, 44 as well as in the more recent period in Bulgarian political life reported above.
Polls and Manipulation of the Political Process in Postcommunist Bulgaria
However, the emphasis on opinion polling data has not always been advantageous for individual political parties. For instance, in 1991, polls indicated that some of the major partners within the Union of the Democratic Forces (the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Agrarians) would stand to maximise their vote if they left the coalition. The polls forecast between 12 and 13 percent electoral support for these parties if they were to campaign outside of the UDF -a more than sufficient level of voter support to pass the four percent electoral threshold necessary to win seats in the National Assembly. In the event, these parties left the UDF, but subsequently failed to achieve this minimum four percent target. This had a dramatic effect on the perception of opinion polls held by both the public and by the political parties:
The split was actually suicide for these [parties] . The main accusation was that the polls provoked those parties to think that they would actually profit from the split off. Which actually did not happen. If UDF had not split at that time they would have had a larger margin over the Socialist Party 45 . The difference was between one and two percent -very, very close. 46 Thus, while opinion polls may provide obvious benefits to the political parties in their general campaigning strategies and their political marketing, their usage for these purposes is often a source of significant controversy. Two of the enduring features of opinion polls in Bulgaria in both communist and postcommunist times, is that they are widely perceived by political elites, parties and citizens alike as manipulative, and that they are treated with scepticism. As Dimiter Stefanov, Vice
Chair of the Democratic Party, claims:
From the beginning [of the democratic transition, 1989] there was widespread scepticism on the work of the political machinery. There was also that scepticism was extended to opinion polls, and early opinion polls, the early agencies were suspected of deliberate misrepresentation. And later the results proved those suspicions were fairly correct. So that didn't bring about much confidence and esteem in the methods of registering and measuring public opinion . . . Up until now a large number of people, including myself, have been inclined to doubt the validity of the method that gauges popularity of politicians. 47 
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It is not only politicians who are sceptics of polls. Many journalists and press editors have reservations about the relationships which often exist between the political parties, newspapers, and the different polling agencies, and of the subsequent manipulation of polls which is alleged to occur:
Every newspaper has its own opinion poll agents . . . So we can use only ours. We can read other newspapers' [polls]. The sociological institutes [pollsters] they go to one or other party. They work for them in every election, especially the first one.
One of them says that the Communists will win. Another said Democrats will.
Everyone said their politicians and their party will win. After that people, including journalists, don't believe [the polls] very much. Everybody knows that these agencies work for these parties and they maybe then say they aren't true. 48 The remainder of this article focuses on this issue of the manipulation of opinion polls in Bulgarian political life. It is an issue that was raised voluntarily without any prompting in virtually all the interviews conducted for this study.
In earlier research conducted across East Europe, it was found that polls were widely criticised on a number of counts. 49 Firstly, it is usually only the larger parties who have the resources to commission them. Consequently, smaller parties often attempt to discredit political opinion polls on the grounds that they both facilitate unfair electoral competition, and help contribute to the continued dominance of the larger parties. In countries like Bulgaria where the electoral system sets a minimum percentage threshold of voter support before a party can gain representation in parliament, this is a particularly contentious area for polling. The concern is that polls can help create a bandwagon for a party if the results indicate that it will likely score above this threshold (4% in Bulgaria), suggesting to voters that their support for the party would not result in a 'wasted vote'. Small, resource-poor political parties are disadvantaged electorally if they are unable to commission their own polls to generate the kind of bandwagons of public support that are possible for the larger, resource-rich parties that can afford opinion polls.
There is also widespread scepticism about the use of polls by those parties who have established relationships with opinion polling companies. This concern is based on the premise that such relationships tend to amount to collusion, in which the objective is to publish misleading results to disorientate rival parties. In Bulgaria, the historical relationship between the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and British-Balkan Social Surveys (BBSS), has been widely criticised on these grounds, although there is no concrete evidence that such a falsification of poll data has taken place. 50 The third major concern about the role and impact of polls in postcommunist countries is the 14 proliferation of (largely unknown) ad hoc 'ghost' pollsters during election campaign periods. These In another example, the Bulgarian President, Zhelieu Zhelev was persuaded by a close group of advisors to stand as a candidate for the UDF nomination to contest the 1996 presidential election.
Against a backdrop in which media-reported polls indicated variable levels of support for the two nominees, the internal poll data presented to Zhelev was relatively conclusive -that he would win the contest if he were to declare his candidacy. Against the advice of some leading colleagues, he opted to stand for the UDF nomination, but ultimately lost by a margin of three to one to Petar Stoyanov. 54 
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As one senior UDF colleague noted, Zhelev's decision to contest the nomination of the UDF was very much influenced by these internal opinion polls. 55 The misleading picture these polls presented about his prospects is generally considered by political commentators in Bulgaria to have played a major part in his inability to foresee failure in the election: In another recent high-profile case, the polls failed to accurately forecast the outcome of the 1995 mayoral election in Sofia. Throughout the campaign, they predicted a close contest between the BSP candidate, Stefan Sofiyanski, and the main challenger from the UDF. However, contrary to all polling expectations, the outcome was a landslide victory for Sofiyanski with 57.6 percent of the vote. 57 The inference to be drawn from these recent examples is that political parties and election candidates place particular faith in the ability of opinion polls to measure their prospects in election contests. However, the messages communicated via the polls are often variable, contradictory and misleading. Usage of the polls is also often misjudged. Such data has even been used selectively to support strategic and tactical electoral positions, even if the rationale for using them is flawed.
The outcome in such cases may have negative consequences for the parties concerned, as these examples appear to indicate. The explanation for these discrepancies between poll forecasts and election outcomes mirrors those revealed in research conducted in the early 1990s -that there is collusion between some of the opinion pollsters, the political parties, and the mass media organisations who publish the findings. 58 This collusion even includes manipulation of the polling data. 59 As a consequence, there is widespread public scepticism of polls:
All of these [opinion polling] companies have connection with political parties.
That is the big problem. Because they are not objective. They have influencegovernment influence and opposition influence. That is the position. It is problematic because people don't believe the results of these surveys. Because they 16 know that the company has a connection either with the government or with the opposition. 60 Most observers consider that this issue is less salient in Bulgarian political life now, than it was in the period immediately following the democratic transition, post-1989. However, the problem still significantly mars the reputation, and consequently the development of opinion polling. 61 Where manipulation of the polls does take place, it appears to serve two functions, both of which are designed to enable a party to gain an advantage over their competitors: to increase their share of voter support at elections, and subsequently their degree of political power. Neither of these functions can be conclusively determined but, through the interviews conducted for this research, both are widely acknowledged to exist. Firstly, the manipulation of polls has the objective to disorientate rival parties. Secondly, publishing misleading accounts of the polls is designed to create a bandwagon of voter support for the party involved. As one interviewee 62 for this research noted:
One thing I am sure of is that opinion polls, manipulated opinion polls, are If that is the case that can explain the variety of opinion polls and the disturbing discrepancy between them and some of the [election] results.
Conclusion
What does the experience of polling in postcommunist Bulgaria, and in particular the way that polls are used by the political parties, reveal about: (a) their impact upon the general political process; and (b) whether George Gallup's ambition for polls -that they should be used to extend democratic practice, create linkages between citizens and political elites, and generally empower voters -is a useful way of understanding the role of opinion polls in postcommunist Bulgaria?
The findings reported in this article suggest that political parties continue to demonstrate a keen degree of interest in polls. As with the findings from earlier investigations in other postcommunist countries, 63 the value attached to polls by the parties, and the usage to which they are put, broadly reflect what has been observed in West European countries. The interest that political parties have in opinion polls reflects more a desire on their part for developing strategies to compete effectively with their rivals, than for engaging in a reflective dialogue with citizens to build a more 'participative' style of democracy. In some cases, polling research is reported to the public in order to mislead rather than enlighten voters, with the express purpose of creating a bandwagon effect for the party, and maximising its share of voter support in election contests. Such a cynical approach to the use of opinion polls is widely perceived to exist, and as a consequence, the public, the media and the political parties continue to poll-watch with a sceptical eye.
A decade after the collapse of communism and the movement toward democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe, political elites use opinion polls not to extend political power to citizens, but to concentrate it in their own hands. This suggests that an understanding of how polls impact on the political process in postcommunist countries is better explained in terms of Schumpeter's view of competitive elitism, than Gallup's direct democracy model.
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